Recent Cases by Staff, Law Review
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 14 
Issue 3 Issue 3 - June 1961 Article 20 
6-1961 
Recent Cases 
Law Review Staff 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Law Review Staff, Recent Cases, 14 Vanderbilt Law Review 1009 (1961) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/20 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
RECENT CASES,
BANKRUPTCY-ASSETS-TRUSTEE'S RIGHTS UNDER 70(c)
ASCERTAINED AT DATE OF BANKRUPTCY RATHER THAN
ANTERIOR POINT OF TIME
More than five months after executing a chattel mortgage to
defendant, the mortgagor filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy
and was adjudged bankrupt. Under applicable state law, chattel
mortgages were void as against creditors until recorded, and no grace
period for filing was provided so as to protect mortgagees from
intervening creditors.' Defendant's lien was unassailable by actual
creditors, as no credit had been extended to the bankrupt between
the date the mortgage was executed and its recordation four days
thereafter. The referee, relying upon section 70(c) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act,2 held the mortgage void as against the trustee in bank-
ruptcy on the ground -that he was vested with the rights of a
"hypothetical" creditor intervening during the four-day period when
the mortgage was "off-record." The district court overruled the
referee and the court of appeals affirmed. On certiorari to the
Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The rights of creditors to which the
trustee succeeds under section 70 (c) are to be ascertained as of the
date of bankruptcy, and not as of an anterior point of time. Lewis
v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
Section 70 (c), characteristically termed the "strong arm clause,"
vests the trustee with the status of a creditor holding a lien by
1. Mich. Pub. Acts 1956, No. 153, provided: 'Every mortgage . .. which
shall not be accompanied by an immediate delivery and followed by
an actual and continued change of possession of the things mortgaged,
shall be absolutely void as against the creditors of the mortgagor, and as
against subsequent purchasers or mortgages in good faith, unless the
mortgage or a true copy thereof shall be filed in the office of the register
of deeds...
Substantially the same provision had earlier been construed as pro-
tecting interim creditors to the fullest extent and therefore recordation
within a reasonable time would not subordinate the rights of creditors inter-
vening before filing. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Collier, 106 F.2d
584 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 682 (1940). Subsequent to the in-
stant case the provision was amended to provide for a 10-day grace period
to protect mortgagees against intervening creditors. MicH. STAT. ANN. §
26.929 (Supp. 1959).
2. "The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming into possession
or control of the court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have
obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bankruptcy,
shall be deemed vested as of such date with all the rights, remedies, and
powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings,
whether or not such a creditor actually exists." Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 66
Stat. 430 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1958).
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legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bankruptcy.3 The
trustee's rights are those which are conferred upon an ideal creditor
under state law in the satisfaction of a lien against the bankruptcy,4
whether or not such a creditor actually exists.5 Although the section
clearly provides that the trustee is vested with a lien at the date
of bankruptcy, it does not specify as to when credit is deemed to
have been extended. In Constance v. Harvey,6 the Court of Appeals
of the Second Circuit reasoned that th6 trustee, as an "ideal hypo-
thetical creditor," should be construed as one who extended credit
at the most advantageous time. Therefore, although a lien is recorded
prior to the date of bankruptcy, if it could be attacked by a creditor
who intervened before recordation, it is void as against the trustee,
as he can claim the same rights as such creditor, even though none
;exists.7 The decision, in enlarging the powers of the unsecured
creditors by relating the trustee's rights back from the date of
bankruptcy, has been widely criticized by legal authorities 8 and
generally is recognized only in its own jurisdiction.9 The Supreme
3. Ibid. The date of bankruptcy is defined as the date when the petition
is filed. Bankruptcy Act § 1(13), 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1(13)
(1958).
4. The trustee under this section is described by Justice Holmes as "the
ideal creditor, irreproachable and without notice, armed cap-a-pie with
every right and power which is conferred by the law of the state upon its
most favored creditor who has acquired a lien by legal or equitable pro-
ceedings." In re Waynesboro Motor Co., 60 F.2d 668, 669 (S.D. Miss. 1932).
5. The clause should be contrasted with § 70(e) which provides: "A
transfer made . . . by a . . . bankrupt . . . which, under any Federal or
State law applicable thereto, is fraudulent as against or voidable for any
other reason by any creditor of the debtor, having a claim provable under
this title, shall be null and void as against the trustee . . . ." 66 Stat. 429
(1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1958). In this section the trustee's rights are
dependent upon and measured by the rights of an actual existing creditor,
except that the transfer may be set aside in its entirety regardless of the
amount of the claim of the creditor in whose shoes the trustee stands. See
Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931). As there were no actual creditors against
whom the mortgage was void under state law in the instant case, the
trustee could not successfully invoke this section.
6. 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955).
7. The applicable state statute as judicially construed, required chattel
mortgages to be filed within a reasonable time, and a failure to comply
with the provision rendered the transfer void as to creditors whose claims
were in existence prior to recordation. In re Myers, 24 F.2d 349 (2d Cir.
1928). Here, though recordation had occurred approximately a year before
bankruptcy, more than ten months had elapsed since the date the mortgage
was executed. As in Michigan (see note 1 supra), the provision was recently
amended to provide a grace period for filing. N. Y. LIN LAW § 230.
8. See, e.g., MacLachlan, Secured and Prior Claims in Bankruptcy, H. R.
5195 To Amend the Bankruptcy Act, A Comment, 13 Bus. LAw. 128 (1957);
Marsh, Constance v. Harvey-The "Strong-Arm Clause" Re-Evaluated, 43
CAiF L. REv. 65 (1955); Seligson, Creditors' Rights, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 708
(1957). Cf. Kleinberg & Masterson, Constance v. Harvey-A Defense, 62
Com. L.J. 124 (1957).
9. The Constance rule was followed reluctantly in its jurisdiction in In re
Gondola Associates, 132 F. Supp. 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), affd sub nom. Conti v.
Volper, 229 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1956). The court regarded the result as
incongruous with the purposes of the act, but concluded that the language of
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Court denied certiorari in Constance and had not decided the ques-
tion prior to the instant case.
In rejecting the Constance rule adopted by the referee below, the
Court'0 had ample grounds for finding it inconsistent with Con-
gressional intent. From the inception of the "strong arm clause"
in the Bankruptcy Act in 1910,11 to the present amended form en-
acted in 1952, the rights of the trustee had been construed as of the
date of bankruptcy. 12 There was nothing in the legislative history
which indicated dissatisfaction with this construction. 3 Moreover,
the provision required the construction. This statement is. criticized by
MacLachlan, who points out: 'Three times . . . [the wording of section
70(c)] directs attention to the date of bankruptcy. First, bv referring thereto
in so many words; secondly, by referring to 'such date'; and thirdly, by
saying 'then'. There is nothing in the historical or pragmatic background of
this language which indicates any intention or any need of giving the trustee
any rights as of any earlier date under this subdivision." MacLachlan, Two
Wrongs Make a Right, 37 TExAs L. REV. 676, 677 (1959).
The doctrine of Constance was relied upon to enable the trustee to deny
the bankrupt the advantage of an enlargement of the value of the homestead
that could be claimed as exempt. Since creditors existing before the
statutory amendment could have obtained liens in excess of the previous
exemption, the trustee was held to be vested of the same rights. England v.
Sanderson, 236 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1956).
The rule was explicitly rejected in In re Billings, 170 F. Supp. 253 (W.D.
Mo. 1959). In In re Consorto Constr. Co., 212 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Klein v. Equity Inv. Co., 348 U.S. 833 (1954), decided
in the same year as Constance, a contrary result was reached in applying
an analogous statute. In the following cases the security statute did not
invalidate unrecorded security interests against general interim creditors
as in Constance. It was held that the Constance rule did not apply; the
courts' dicta are typical of the criticism expressed against that decision:
In re Di Pierro, 159 F. Supp. 497 (D. Me. 1958) (invalid against creditors
acquiring specific liens before recordation); In re American Textile Printers
Co., 152 F. Supp. 901 (D. N.J. 1957) (invalid against lien creditors levying
before recordation).
10. The Court's decision was unanimous. Justice Harlan, who had written
the opinion in Constance as a judge on the court of appeals, reversed his
previous position.
11. 36 Stat. 840 (1910).
12. E.g., In re Kranz Candy Co., 214 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1954); Fifth Third
Union Trust Co. v. Kennedy, 185 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1950); Bailey v. Baker
Ice Mach. Co., 239 U.S. 268 (1915). Cf. Zamore v. Goldblatt, 194 F.2d 933
(2d Cir.) cert. denied 343 U.S. 979 (1952), which is generally regarded as
merely a mistake of the pen in referring to § 70(c) in lieu of § 70(e).
Seligson, Bankruptcy, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 558 (1955).
13. In the original clause the trustee was vested with the rights of a
creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings in property in the
possession of the bankrupt at the date of bankruptcy. In other property
the trustee was given the rights of a "judgment creditor holding an execu-
tion duly returned unsatisfied." 36 Stat. 840 (1910). The clause was trans-
posed into § 70(c) in 1938 without substantial change. 52 Stat. 881 (1938).
By a 1950 amendment the distinction discussed above between the two
classes of property was abolished and the trustee was given the status of
a lien creditor as to both types of property. 64 Stat. 26 (1950). However,
an anomaly was created since the trustee was -given a lien upon property to
which he also had title. The language of the 1952 amendment, upon which
the Constance court relied, was merely a rephrasing of the clause for the
purpose of clarifying its meaning. 66 Stat. 430 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c)
(1958). See 4 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 70.47 (14th ed. 1959); MAcLAcHLAN,
BANKRUPTCY § 183 (1956); H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1952)
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the Constance rule renders section 70(e) of the act 14 superfluous.
That section enables the trustee to set aside transfers made by the
bankrupt which any creditor having a provable claim could avoid.15
As the rights of a hypothetical creditor under section 70(c) would
always be equal to or greater than those of any actual creditor,
there would be no necessity for the trustee to proceed under section
70(e). The most significant defect noted by the Court in the Con-
stance rule is its effect in impairing the rights of secured creditors.
As the rule is not limited to cases where a creditor has been actually
prejudiced, the occurrence of bankruptcy gives a windfall to general
creditors at the expense of lien holders. The rule also destroys the
balance between the secured and unsecured creditors created by
Congress in those provisions which specify "periods of repose"'16
beyond which the unsecured creditors' rights are barred.17 There
would be no limit to the trustee's power to set aside transactions,
though entered into years before in good faith, other than that of
his ability to conceive of some creditor who could avoid the lien.
The decision in the instant case removes a serious threat to se-
curity transactions caused by misinterpretation of the "strong arm
clause." After the Constance decision, credit became costlier and
more difficult to obtain in New York,18 even though recordation
within a reasonable time would perfect mortgages against both
subsequent creditors and those existing at the date of recordation. 19
It is apparent that the rule would result in a greater impairment
of credit in a jurisdiction where, as here, there is no reasonable time
provided for filing to protect against intervening creditors.20 A delay
of even one day in recording a mortgage would be sufficient to
invalidate the lien should bankruptcy subsequently occur. By re-
garding the trustee as a hypothetical creditor who extended credit
at the date of bankruptcy, the Court places the "strong arm clause"
(concerning last amendment). In addition, Congress had passed a bill to
amend several provisions of the act, including an amendment of § 70(c) to
change the Constance decision, but the bill was vetoed by the President.
H.R. 7242, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
14. 66 Stat. 429 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1958).
15. Ibid. See note 5 supra.
16. 364 U.S. at'606.
17. E.g., in § 60 (b), transfers made or perfected under certain conditions
within four months of bankruptcy are voidable by the trustee. 64 Stat. 25
(1950), .11 U.S.C. § 96 (1958). The same policy underlies § 67(a), which
invalidates liens against the debtor's property obtained through judicial
proceedings within four months of bankruptcy under certain conditions, and
§ 67(d) (2), the fradulent conveyance provision, which extends back for one
year. 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1958); 66 Stat. 428 (1952),
11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (2) (1958).
18. MacLachlan, Two Wrongs Make a. Right, 37 TExAs L. R.v. 676, 679
(1959).
19. See note 7 supra.
20. See note 1 supra. For a discussion of the various types of security
statutes, see 4 CoLLR, BANKRUPTCY §§ 70.56-.66 (14th ed. 1959).
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in harmony with the act's basic scheme of preserving security in-
terests which are fairly acquired. The contrary view results in
avoidance of liens without regard to prejudice to other creditors.
Clearly, neither the language of the act, nor the policy of promoting
equal distribution of the bankrupt's assets, necessitates such an
encroachment upon the rights of the secured creditors.
CONTEMPT-PUBLISHER NOT IN CONTEMPT FOR
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES WHICH HE REASONABLY DID NOT
BELIEVE WOULD INTERFERE WITH TRIAL
During a criminal trial, a newspaper published articles on the ac-
cused's activities' that were inadmissible as evidence at the trial. At
a recess the jury was allowed to disperse and several of the jurors
read these articles; when the court was informed of this, a mistrial
was declared. For publishing the articles, the newspaper publisher
was convicted of contempt of court. On appeal,2 the trial court's
conviction was reversed on the ground that such publications cannot
be contempt of court because not committed within the presence of
the court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice,
as provided by state statute.3 The trial court then amended its cita-
tion, alleging that the statute violated the state constitution by in-
fringing the inherent judicial power of all constitutional courts of
record to punish for contempt, and held the defendant in contempt.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, held, reversed. Since
the court permitted the jurors to disperse without directing them not
to read or listen to any comments on the case, the publisher 4 could not
have reasonably anticipated that the articles would interfere with a
fair and impartial trial already in progress. Atlanta Newspaper, Inc.
v. State of Georgia, 216 Ga. 399, 116 S.E.2d 580 (1960).
The sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
guarantees the accused in a criminal proceeding the right to a fair
1. The articles referred to the accused as formerly being Georgia's number
one wanted man and self-admitted holdup artist. Reference was also made
to his past criminal record, his previous escapes from confinement, and to
further charges then pending against him.
2. 101 Ga. App. 105, 113 S.E.2d 148 (1960).
3. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-105 (1935): "The powers of the several courts to
issue attachments and-inflict summary punishment for contempt of court
shall extend only to cases of misbehavior of any person or persons in the
presence of said courts or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of
justice .... "
4. See also Roberts v. State, 216 Ga. 405, 116 S.E.2d 585 -(1960), a com-
panion case, in which the court held that the reporter who wrote one of the
articles concerned could likewise not be held in contempt.
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and speedy trial by an impartial jury;5 the various state constitutions
have also provided a similar guarantee. A necessary ingredient of
this guarantee is the right to have the verdict rendered solely upon
the evidence offered in open court rather than upon any outside
report of the case.6 In exercising its inherent contempt power7 to
protect this right, courts have been hindered by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of the press.8 Punishment for contempt in
the federal courts was restricted early to "misbehavior" committed
within the "presence of the court" or "so near thereto" as to obstruct
the administration of justice.9 Prior to 1941, "so near thereto" had
been interpreted to mean any act that had a "reasonable tendency" to
interfere with the administration of justice. 10 But Nye v. United
States" changed the federal courts law by limiting the phrase "so near
thereto" to acts committed within the physical proximity of the
court. Shortly thereafter, Bridges v. California12 limited the state
courts' contempt power to cases in which a "clear and present danger"
existed. 3 The Court strengthened this test 4 by reversing contempt
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892); Briggs v. United States, 221
F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1955); Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1940).
7. "[Tlhe process of contempt is an essential and inherent attribute of
jurisdiction of every court of record, and this judicial power may not be
confined by limitations of a [state] statute, except in respect of punishment."
Young v. Knight, 329 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Ky. 1959). See also La Grange v.
State, 238 Ind. 689, 153 N.E.2d 593 (1958); In re Assignment of Huff, 352
Mich. 402, 91 N.W.2d 613 (1958); Cobb v. State, 187 Ga. 448, 200 S.E. 796
(1939); Schmidt v. Cooper, 274 Ill. 243, 113 N.E. 641 (1916); Bradley v. State,
111 Ga. 168, 36 S.E. 630 (1900).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. 4 Stat. 487 (1831). Similar language is embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1958).
10. See Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 403 (1918). See
also Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907); United States v. Sullens, 36
F.2d 230 (S.D. Miss. 1929); United States v. Sanders, 290 Fed. 428 (W.D.
Tenn. 1923); In re Independent Publishing Co., 240 Fed. 849 (9th Cir. 1917);
United States v. Providence Tribune Co., 241 Fed. 524 (D.R.I. 1917); Telegram
Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 52 N.E. 445, (1899); Myers
v. State, 46 Ohio St. 473, 22 N.E. 43 (1889).
11. 313 U.S. 33 (1941). A contempt conviction of petitioner, who had
wrongfully induced an administrator to dismiss a suit in a federal district
court, was reversed. The Court emphasized that the words "so near thereto"
were to be construed in a geographical sense; since the misbehavior had
occurred one hundred miles away, the act was not punishable for contempt
in that it was not done in the vicinity of the court. In this opinion, the
"reasonable tendency" test of the Toledo Newspaper case was expressly
overruled.
12. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
13. The test, as such, is whether the words used are used in such cir-
cumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that will bring about the substantive evils that Congress or the state has a
right to prevent. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
14. In determining whether or not a "clear and present danger" exists, the
Court has emphasized that the threat must "immediately imperil" the ad-
ministration of justice and must be "highly eminent" and the lingering
evil must be "serious" and "substantial." Publications having only a
reasonable tendency, or which are merely likely to obstruct justice cannot
1014 [ VOL. 14
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convictions in Florida15 and Texas16 cases as being violative of the
freedom of the press guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments.17 Unlike the English law of contempt,18 these decisions 19 seem
to place the freedom of press on a higher plane than the right to a fair
trial,20 since influencing the jury is not punishable if committed away
from the vicinity of the court.21 The lower federal courts have con-
sistently followed these decisions22 and various state courts have
applied the "clear and present danger" test in conformity with the
present federal rationale.23
*be summarily punished. See cases cited, infra note 19.
15. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
16. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
17. "In a series of decisions beginning with Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
,652 (1925), this Court held that the liberty of speech and of the press which
the First Amendment guarantees against abridgement by the federal govern-
ment is within the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action. That principle has been
followed and reaffirmed to the present day." Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
*343 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1952).
18. The courts of England have been quick to exercise their broad summary
-contempt powers; as a result, no comment other than an accurate and fair
report can be published until the proceedings are closed. King v. Tibbits,
[1902] 1 K.B. 77; King v. Parke, [1903] 2 K.B. 432; Rex v. Editor of the
"'Evening Standard," 40 T.L.R. 833 (K.B. 1924); Rex v. Clarke 103 L.T.R.
(n.s.) 636 (K.B. 1910).
19. Nye v. United States, supra note 11; Bridges v. California, supra note
12; Pennekamp v. Florida, supra note 15; Craig v. Harney, supra note 16.
Unfortunately the Court refused to grant certiorari in Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show, Inc., 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912
(1950). [Respondent radio stations were found in contempt for reporting
information concerning a murder suspect's past record and alleged conviction
under a law prohibiting such reporting when it interfered with a fair trial;
in reversing the decision, the Maryland Supreme Court applied the "clear
.and present danger" test and held such a provision was an invalid restraint
on freedom of the press.]
As a result of the Court's refusal, the absolute extent to which the first
amendment restricts the courts from exercising the power of contempt to
punish newspapers is still an open question.
20. Although no citation for contempt can be enforced under the present
rationale unless committed within the court's physical presence, the court
may, at its discretion, grant the accused a new trial, a continuance, or even
a reversal. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (per curiam);
Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951); United States v. Dioguardi, 147
F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
21. Misconduct in the "presence of the court" is not limited to that com-
mitted within the immediate presence of the judge. The court is present
whenever any of its constituent parts, the judge, the court room, the jury, or
the jury room, is engaged in the prosecution of the business of the court. Ex
parte Aldridge, 334 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959). See also Savin, 131
U.S. 267 (1889); State v. Goff, 228 S.C. 17, 88 S.E.2d 788 (1955); Harding v.
IVIcCullough, 236 Iowa 556, 19 N.W.2d 613 (1945).
22. Hoffman v. Perrucci, 117 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1953); United States
ex rel May v. American Mach. Co., 116 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Wash. 1953);
Smotherman v. United States, 186 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1950).
23. Convictions reversed because no "clear and present danger" was
present: People v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 132 Cal. App. 2d 317, 282 P.2d
559 (1955); State ex rel. Stanton v. Murray, 231 Ind. 223, 108 N.E.2d 251
(1952); Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949).
See also In the matter of Jameson, 139 Colo. 171, 340 P.2d 423 (1959).
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In the instant case, the court unanimously reaffirmed its position24
that the power to punish for contempt was inherent in every court
of record and that any legislative attempt to limit this power is not
binding upon the court.25 Although the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of the press is to receive the widest possible application, the
press should refrain from publishing and distributing articles which
it could reasonably anticipate would interfere with an impartial trial;
publication under the circumstances may subject it to a contempt
citation.26 But the court held there was no contempt in the instant
case because the defendant could not reasonably anticipate that in-
terference would result from the articles under the circumstances.
Since the trial was in progress, the defendant had a right to assume
the jury would not disperse until the trial's termination unless
properly directed by the judge.27
The court's decision under the circumstances seems justifiable. But
the opinion leaves a far-reaching implication in that it heavily em-
phasizes that the right to an impartial trial should be considered the
paramount constitutional guarantee.2 8 Conceivably, this application of
a "reasonable anticipation" test is a reversion to the pre-1941 doctrine
and will apply to any act that prevents the administration of justice,
irrespective of a physical relationship to the court. It is noteworthy
that this state court made no mention of using the "clear and present
danger" test of Bridges.29 Such a reversion is highly commendable
when contrasted with the unjust extent to which the present rationale
has limited the court's power to punish for interference with a
criminal trial. This extreme limitation is vividly emphasized by a
federal court decision 3 that the influencing of prospective jurors was
24. Cobb. v. State, 187 Ga. 448, 200 S.E. 796 (1939); Bradley v. State, 111
Ga. 168, 36 S.E. 630 (1900).
25. 116 S.E.2d at 580.
26. Id. at 584.
27. Ibid.
28. Query as to whether the federal guarantee of a right to an impartial
trial is carried over to the state courts by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment? See Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565 (1948); Fay
v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947). Both cases reject the proposition that
the guarantee of the sixth amendment is embodied in the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment so as to be a limitation upon the states. The
Court has also held that the right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment is not embodied per se in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
29. Perhaps the reason for this is that Georgia has always had the statutory
language of the federal statute as its own state law. "Our own act defining
contempts is literal copy of the law of Congress of March, 1831." Chipman
v. Barron, 2 Ga. 220, 226 (1847).
30. "Prospective jurors who have not . . .been summoned to appear
are not component parts of the court; and distribution to them of the
magazine article . . . could not be regarded as misbehavior in the presence
of the court, or so near thereto as to interfere, in a physical sense, with the
court's functions." United States ex rel May v. American Mach. Co., 116
F. Supp. 160, 163 (E.D. Wash. 1953).
1016 [VOL. 14
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not misbehavior committed within the presence of the court. If the
courts are required to zealously prevent any biased information from
reaching the jury once it has been impaneled, it seems equally im-
portant that they be given the power to insure that the jury selected
will be an impartial one in the first instance.
Certainly it is time to return to the courts the power to prevent
an interference with the administration of justice, wherever com-
mitted. The substance of freedom of the press will not be impaired
by restoring this power. As Justice Holmes has indicated,31 the timing
of the comment is all important. During the trial there should be no
comment by the press in order to protect the rights of the accused;
after the proceeding has terminated, the press is perfectly free to
publish the facts and to criticize the jury or the judges as the cir-
cumstances indicate. Comment at this time can be a valuable aid in
disclosing any possible judicial malfunction.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-ERIE DOCTRINE-IMPEACHMENT
EVIDENCE NOT OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE
Plaintiff brought an action on a fire insurance policy. The defendant
removed the case to the federal district court on grounds of diversity
of citizenship. Prior to this action the defendant, pursuant to the
terms of the policy, had examined the plaintiff's president under oath
and set up as a defense that in the examination he had falsely sworn
to material facts.1 At the trial on cross examination the defendant
offered this examination of the president. The plaintiff urged that
the statement be excluded under a Florida statute that prohibited
the use of a written statement by an injured person, with respect to
injury to person or property, if the person making the statement was
denied a copy upon request.2 The district court sustained the ob-
jection. On appeal, held, reversed. Evidence is admissible for im-
peachment purposes under rule 43 (a) (federal equity practice) 3 of
31. '"hen a case is finished, courts are subject to the same criticism as
other people, but the propriety and necessity of preventing interference with
the course of justice by premature statement, argument or intimidation
hardly can be denied." Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463 (1907).
1. "If the insured has been guilty of wilful fraud or false swearing, he
cannot recover.... The fraud would not only forfeit the policy, but would
also forfeit any claim for loss." 5 APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAw & PRACTICE §
3587 at 761-62 (1941).
2. The pertinent statute is FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.33 (1959).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 43 provides for the admission of evidence under three
categories: (1) federal statutes; (2) federal equity practice; (3) state statutes,
rules or common law. For a general discussion of Rule 43 see 5 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE c. 43 (1951); Green, The Admissibility of Evidence Under
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since its admission is not out-
come-determinative under the Erie doctrine. Monarch Ins. Co. V.
Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
For the purpose of this discussion it is necessary to point out the
difference in the meaning of the words "substantive" and "procedural"
as applied in the federal courts and state courts respectively. For
state purposes, a rule may be termed either substantive or procedural
according to the interpretation given it by the state court, but re-
gardless of such interpretation it will be treated as substantive for
purposes of determining the applicable law in diversity actions if its
application will be determinative of the outcome.4 In the traditional
conflicts of law situation, the law of the locus governs substance and
the law of the forum governs procedure; rules governing the ad-
missibility of evidence are treated as procedural. 5
The year 1938 placed in a new setting the problem of when state
law is to be applied in federal courts. The case of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins6 obliterated the principle of a substantive common law in
the federal courts and held that the substantive law to be applied
in diversity cases is the law of the state in which the federal court
sits.7 The Supreme Court's decision in Guaranty Trust Co. v. YorkO
interpreted the Erie doctrine as saying that if a state rule is de-
terminative of the outcome then it is to be applied in diversity actions
even though the rule is labeled "procedural." Under the Guaranty
Trust principle the state rules governing the statute of limitations,9
the Federal Rules, 55 HARv. L. REv. 197 (1941); Green, Federal Civil Pro-
cedure Rule 43(a), 5 VAND. L. REv. 560 (1952).
4. See Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
650 (1940) where the court held that burden of proof which was termed pro-
cedural by the state court was none the less to be applied by the Federal
court under the theory that it was substantive for the purpose of the Erie
doctrine. In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) the
Supreme Court cited the Sampson case with approval and said that in a
conflict of laws question the federal district court in a diversity action must
apply the conflicts rule which would be applied by the courts of the state in
which it is sitting.
5. See 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 43.02 [2] (1951); Joiner, Uniform Rules
of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D. 429 (1957); Morgan, Rules of
Evidence--Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. REV. 467 (1957). But see
Willitt v. Purvis, 276 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1960) which held that rules of evidence
can be substantive.
6. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7. Prior to Erie the case of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) said
that the federal courts in diversity actions were to follow only the state
statutory law. For examples of the pre-Erie attitude see Beals v. Hale, 45 U.S.
(4 How.) 37 (1846); Erie R.R. v. Hilt, 247 U.S. 97 (1918); Graham v. White-
Phillips Co., 296 U.S. 27 (1935).
8. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
9. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) held
that since the statute of limitations had not been tolled in time by state law
and since the plaintiff's action was barred in the state court the federal district
court would have to follow the state procedural rule.
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right to bring a stockholder's derivative suit,'
0 res judicata," and
burden of proof'2 have been applied in lieu of conflicting federal rules.
Such state rules go to the substance of the plaintiff's cause of action
and are obviously determinative of the outcome. Whether a state
rule that is not so obviously determinative of the outcome should be
applied in lieu of a conflicting federal rule is a question on which
courts have reached different results.13 The courts have avoided ruling
on the extent to which the federal rules will yield to state rules be-
cause of the possibility of raising the constitutional question of the
extent to which a state can control litigation in the federal courts.
4
The court in the instant case, after concluding that the evidence
sought to be admitted by the defendant would be admissible under
federal equity practice, turned to the question of whether it should be
excluded by virtue of the Florida statute.15 It approached the prob-
10. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) held that
the state statute regulating the right of a stockholder to bring a derivative
suit was controlling in the federal courts in diversity actions. But cf. Bomar
v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947), and Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S.
392 (1946) which held that in a diversity action based on a federally
created right the state laws have no effect.
11. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), which held that where a
state statute barred an action because it was res judicata the action was
also barred in federal courts. But cf. First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines,
342 U.S. 396 (1952) where suit was brought in Illinois based on a Utah
wrongful death statute. There was an Illinois statute prohibiting actions for
wrongful death occuring outside the state. The Supreme Court held that
the Illinois statute violated the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution
and was therefore unconstitutional.
12. Sampson v. Channell, supra note 4.
13. One frequently litigated problem arises where a state law protects
privileged communications and the federal rules would allow discovery. Those
cases holding the statq rule superior to the federal rule are: Berdon v.
McDuff, 15 F.R.D. 29 (E.D. Mich. 1953); Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sanitarium
Co., 74 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. N.Y. 1947). See also Pugh, Rule 43(a) and the
Communication Privileged Under State Law: An Analysis of Confusion, 7
V~rm. L. REv. 556 (1954). Contra: Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co.,
15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio, 1953); Holbert v. Chase, 12 F.R.D. 171 (E.D. S.C.
1952). Cf. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) which held that a
federal rule compelling medical examination should prevail over a contrary
state rule. Another situation in which a state procedural rule conflicts with
federal procedure is in judge-jury situations. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) the Court refused to apply a state rule
that called for a non-jury trial of a particular issue. The Court said that
there were "countervailing considerations" at work in that the federal rules
and the Constitution both called for a jury trial and that the outcome of the
case was not the only factor to be considered. See also McSweeney v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 128 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1942); Gorham v. Mutual Benefit
Health & Acc. Ass'n, 114 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1940). But cf. In re Steinberg,
138 F. Supp. 462 (1956) which held that rules of evidence of the state in which
a bankruptcy court sits govern, and that competency of a witness to testify
is also determined by state law. See generally Hill, The Erie Doctrine in
Bankruptcy, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1013 (1953).
14. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Palmer v. Hoffman,
318 U.S. 109 (1943). See generally Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Con-
stitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427 (1958).
15. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Dixon, 207 F.2d 899 (5th Cir. 1953),
which held that if a state law excludes evidence and there is no federal statute
or rule that makes it admissible then the evidence must be excluded. See
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lem on the assumption that the admissibility of evidence would be
treated as procedural for most purposes and that the only reason
for excluding the evidence under the Erie doctrine would be that the
evidence was determinative of the outcome. The court said that
impeachment evidence can rarely be so decisive as to have a notable
effect on the outcome since neither judge nor jury will necessarily
credit it.16 Furthermore, since the federal rules provide an alternative
means of establishing the fact that the witness made the ex parte
statement and that it was false, the Florida statute would prevent
only the most unresourceful advocate from introducing the evidence
in question.' 7 The "outcome-determinative" test requires, as a mini-
mum, that all reasonable steps have been taken to overcome the effect
of the Florida statute. In concluding, the court said that the use of
the federal rules does not thwart the purpose of the Florida statute
since the plaintiff could have obtained a copy of the ex parte state-
ment by relying on the federal rules of discovery, and thus have
achieved the disclosure sought to be encouraged by the state statute.18
The conclusion in the instant case is seemingly correct since im-
peachment evidence is dependent on so many variables it cannot be
said to be determinative of the outcome.19 However, in reaching its
decision the court ignores the question of just what degree of cer-
tainty must exist to make a state procedural rule determinative of the
outcome so that a federal court can say the federal rule must yield
to the state rule. Since the application of the outcome-determinative
test has confused and rendered uncertain the application of the federal
rules in both district and circuit courts, it is submitted that the
courts should formulate a rule or set of rules that would expedite
trials in the district courts and cut down the number of appeals taken
from rulings under the present outcome-determinative test. One
possible solution would be to give the trial judge a wide discretion
in deciding if the state rule is determinative of the outcome, and
to make his judgment final except in cases where it can be shown
also Green, Federal Civil Procedure, Rule 43 (a), 5 VA~N. L. REv. 560 (1952);
Green, The Admissibility of Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 55 HARv. L.
Ra,. 197 (1941).
16. In order for impeachment evidence to have any effect the jury must
not only believe that the witness has knowingly made inconsistent state-
ments but must also give such weight to the impeachment evidence as to
disbelieve the witness's statements. See McCoRMcK, EviDENCE §§ 33-39
(1954).
17. As pointed out in the court's opinion the defendant could, under Rule
36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, request that the plaintiff admit
the truth of the ex parte statement. If the plaintiff failed to answer, Rule 8
(d) would put the matter in issue by implied denial.
18. The plaintiff could have obtained a copy of the ex parte statement by
relying on Rule 34 which allows any party to order any other party to "pro-
duce and permit the inspection and copying. .. of any designated documents."
19. See note 16 supra.
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he clearly abused his discretion. The feasibility of such a rule has
been demonstrated by the Supreme Court in an analogous situation.
20
Another solution would be to formulate a detailed set of rules govern-
ing the admissibility of evidence to be adopted by the Supreme
Court.21 The first solution seems to be more practical since it would
deal with all phases of state rules and would not be limited to matters
of evidence. Furthermore, the formulation of a detailed set of rules
would be an imponderable task since the divergence of authority on
various problems of evidence makes the formulation of fixed rules
difficult.22 Perhaps neither of the above solutions will be adequate, but
until some more definite rule is adopted judges and lawyers will
continue to grapple with the nebulous outcome-determinative test.
JURISDICTION-FEDERAL DEATH ON HIGH SEAS ACT
GRANTS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO FEDERAL COURTS
Decedent was killed when an airplane in which he was a passenger
crashed into the Pacific Ocean more than three miles off the coast of
California. Decedent's administratrix brought an action for wrongful
death' in a California state court against the executor of deceased
20. In Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) the Supreme Court
held that federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over workmens' compensa-
tion claims arising from maritime accidents. However, state courts did have
jurisdiction over matters that were "maritime but local" and could award
claims in those situations. The use of the phrase "maritime but local" caused
a great deal of confusion and became an extremely difficult test to apply. In
Davis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 317 U.S. 249 (1942) the Supreme
Court recognized the situation as being unsatisfactory and allowed the trial
judge to proceed under either the federal statute or state statute in those
cases that were in the "twilight zone," and created a presumption in favor
of the trial judge's decision.
21. For a more complete discussion of this suggestion see 5 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRAcTicE .§ 43.02 [5] (1951). Apparently, progress may be in the offing. See
Morgan, Difficulties Impeding Reform in the Law of Evidence, 14 VAD. L. REV.
725, 737 (1961).
22. E.g., there are many different views on the effect of a presumption:
Thayer's, that the presumption fixes only the risk of non-production of evi-
dence sufficient to justify a finding of non-existence of the presumed fact; the
Ohio view, that the rebuttal evidence must be sufficient to put the trier of fact's
mind in doubt; and the California view, that the rebuttal evidence must be
sufficient to put the trier of fact's mind in equilibrium.
1. Decedent and wife, Mr. and Mrs. Donald B. Gordon, were riding in an
airplane owned by defendant Reynolds and piloted by one Duncan. Mrs.
Gordon, the administratrix, testified that Duncan was asked to land when
they were over Los Angeles, Santa Barbara and San Simeon, and that he
refused to do so on each occasion. She further argued that each of these
occurrences was a proximate cause of the crash and, thus, of decedent's
death. Because these three acts occurred within the territorial limits of
California, it was contended that California's wrongful death statute [CAL.
CODE CIV. PRoc. § 377 (Deering 1953)] applied. The court held that the events
referred to could not be considered as proximate causes. Gordon v. Reynolds,
10 Cal. Rptr. 73 (Cal. App. 1960).
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pilot and the owner of the airplane. She contended that the Federal
Death on the High Seas Act 2 should be enforced by the California
state court. There was a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. On appeal,
held, affirmed. The Federal Death on the High Seas Act grants ex-
clusive jurisdiction to the federal district courts. Gordon v. Reynolds,
10 Cal. Rptr. 73 (Cal. App. 1960).
The persistent problem of our federal system that is presented
in this case involves the privilege of a state court to enforce a
federally created right of action. There is some authority to the
effect that state courts "are under a constitutional obligation to
vindicate" federally created rights.3 This view has often been quali-
fied by allowing the state court to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
in specified circumstances; 4 and, significantly, legal scholars and the
courts have been careful to recognize that Congress does have the
power to vest exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters in the
federal courts.5 Where the federal courts have jurisdiction, state
courts are generally said to have concurrent jurisdiction "unless
Congress has vested exclusive jurisdiction in one or more federal
courts." 6 Hence, the problem in the instant case is whether exclusive
jurisdiction has been granted to federal district courts over cases in-
volving wrongful death upon the high seas. In 1907, the Supreme
Court of the United States recognized the power 7 of a state to apply
2. Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537-38 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68
(1958).
3. "If federal rights are involved, perhaps the state courts are under a
constitutional obligation to vindicate them. There are cases, like Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) . . . and General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211
(1908) . . . which seem to say so." HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 312 (1953). See also Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S.
130 (1876).
4. This obligation is "subject to the qualification that the state court may
decline to exercise jurisdiction, as for example, where the state forum is
an inconvenient one, under circumstances that do not amount to discrimination
against the federal claim." 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 0.6 [3], at 234 (2d ed.
1960).
5. "The power of Congress to make exclusive any valid grant of jurisdiction
has hardly been in issue." HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEm 373 (1953). "It seems, then, that there was no doubt in the
minds of a majority of members of the first session of Congress that power
existed in Congress to vest exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters in
the federal courts .... [I]n The Moses Taylor, it was held that Congress
could, in its discretion, grant exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts over
cases within the judicial power enumerated in Article III." 1 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE if 0.6 [3], at 228, 230 (2d ed. 1960). See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 411 (1867). The generally accepted statement of the rule is as
follows: "Although a federal court may have jurisdiction over a particular
matter, state courts continue to have jurisdiction where they in the past
have exercised jurisdiction, unless Congress has expressly or by necessary
implication vested exclusive jurisdiction in the federal court." 1 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE II 0.6 [3], at 233 (2d ed. 1960).
6. 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE if 0.6 [3], at 236 (2d ed. 1960).
7. This was a new power as recognized by the Supreme Court, but in 1879
the New York Court of Appeals had held the New York statute applicable
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its wrongful death statute to occurrences culminating upon the high
seas. In order to establish application of the statute, however, the
vessel upon which the wrong was committed must have been under
the flag of the state8 or the person committing the wrong must have
been a citizen of the state.9 Perplexing problems as to the choice of
law arose from that decision,10 and the Federal Death on the High
Seas Act, passed in 1920, was the long awaited attempt to resolve
those problems. The federal act provides that a suit for wrongful
death upon extraterritorial waters "may" be maintained by the per-
sonal representative in admiralty." However, section 7 of the act
contains a provision leaving "any State statute giving or regulating
rights of action or remedies for death" unaffected.12 There is some
authority supporting the view that the word "may," as employed in
the statute, renders the grant of jurisdiction to admiralty permissive
only and that section 7 makes it clear that "any other applicable
remedial statute, federal or local, available to claimants" remains
enforceable under the act. 13 According to this view, the act creates
new substantive rights which govern liabilities of the parties, but those
rights may be enforced in state courts under state statutes that pro-
vide an applicable remedy.14 Despite the "clear" language of section
in a case involving a death on the high seas. See Wilson v. Transocean
Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 87-88 (N.D. Cal. 1954), citing McDonald v. Mallory,
77 N.Y. 546, 547 (1879).
8. The basis for this doctrine is the old fiction that a vessel at sea is re-
garded as part of the territory of the country (or state) whose flag it flies.
See note 12 infra, with regard to the problem of whether the "law of the
flag" is determined by the ship owner's domicile or the ship's home port.
9. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
10. Whose law should govern if the vessel of one state was within the
territorial boundaries of another when the wrong was committed? Whose
law should govern when there was a collision between vessels of different
states? Should jurisdiction over a particular vessel be determined by the
owner's domicile or by the vessel's home port? The latter question was
only one of the problems that faced the court in The Middlesex, 253 Fed. 142
(D. Mass. 1916). In that case there had been a collision between two vessels.
The Middlesex was owned by a New Jersey corporation but had her home
port in Boston, Massachusetts. The Hudson was owned by a Maine corpora-
tion and apparently had her home port in that state. All three states had
statutes which were potentially applicable, but when suit was brought in
,Massachusetts, the court threw up its hands, declined to apply one .statute
rather than the other and simply denied recovery "under the circumstances."
The decision in this case indicates the bewildering state of the law in this
field at that time. See Magruder & Grout, Wrongful Death Within the Ad-
m nralty Jurisdiction, 35 YALE L.J. 395, 409-18 (1926) for an "excellent dis-
cussion of the problems related to "Extraterritorial Application of State Death
Acts." In connection therewith, see Robinson, Wrongful Death in Admiralty
and the Conflict of Laws, 36 COLum. L. REV. 406 '(1936).
11. Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1958).
12. 41 Stat. 538, 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1958).
13. This view has its greatest stronghold in New York. See Ledet v.
United Aircraft Corp., 208 N.Y.S.2d 454 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Wyman v. Pan
American Airways, Inc., 267 App. Div. 947, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459, aff'd, 293 N.Y.
878, 59 N.E.2d 785 (1944); Elliott v. Steinfeldt, 254 App. Div. 739, 4 N.Y.S.2d
9 (1938).
14. "The Federal Death on the High Seas Act .-. . supersedes the state
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7, the weight of case law has favored the exclusive jurisdiction of
federal district courts;15 and this view has been supported by almost
all legal scholars who have ventured a comment.
16
In the instant case the court declared that California's wrongful
death statute had no extraterritorial effect 17 and went on to conclude
that the California state court could not enforce the federal right
created by the Death on the High Seas Act.18 However, the court's
opinion implies that the same result would have been reached with
respect to the federal right, regardless of the scope of the state statute.
Although it spoke of the contrary New York cases as being dis-
tinguishable due to the earlier New York decision that its state statute
did apply to death on the high seas,19 the California court expressly
adopted the view that federal jurisdiction is exclusive under the
federal act. The court's rationale was simply that the act provides a
remedy in admiralty where federal jurisdiction is exclusive.
20
The legislative history of the Federal Death on the High Seas Act
would appear to strengthen the minority interpretation that the grant
of jurisdiction to federal courts was only an alternative grant. Section
7, when introduced, read: "[T]he provisions of any State statute
giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not
be affected, by this Act as to causes of action accruing within the
territorial limits of any state"2 1 During the course of debate the
section was amended so as to delete the phrase: "as to causes of
action accruing within the territorial limits of any state."22 It has
been said that this action on the part of the legislature "rendered the
death statute ... in so far as it creates and defines substantive rights arising
out of wrongful death on the high seas .... But the right to maintain the
action in the state courts, which had long existed under the Judiciary Act of
1789 .. .was not necessarily affected by the federal statute .... Section 1
of the federal act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 761, grants jurisdiction to the federal Dis-
trict Courts in admiralty, but does not purport to withdraw jurisdiction from
any other court. Section 7, 46 U.S.C.A. § 767, is intended, as we view it, to
protect the right of state courts to entertain actions founded on the federal
act." Elliott v. Steinfeldt, 254 App. Div. 739, 4 N.Y.S.2d 9, 9-10 (1938).
Accord, Sierra v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 519, 521
(D. P. R. 1952).
15. See Trihey v. Transocean Airlines, Inc., 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1958)
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 838 (1958); Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 154
F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd., 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 907 (1957); Kunkel v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 591 (S.D. Cal.
1956); Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 124 F. Supp. 13 (D. Hawaii 1954), aff'd,
230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 802 (1956); Wilson v.
Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
16. Hughes, Death Actions in Admiralty, 31 YALEn L. J. 115 (1921); Magru-
der & Grout, Wrongful Death Within the Admiralty Jurisdiction, 35 YALE L. J.
395 (1926); Comment, 41 CoR=NLL L.Q. 243 (1956).
17. 10 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
18. Id. at 78.
19. See note 9 supra.
20. 10 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
21. 59 CONG. REc. 4482 (1920) (Emphasis added.)
22. See Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 89-90 (N.D. Cal.
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Congressional intent in this respect uncertain."2 3 But in striking this
restrictive clause, it would certainly appear that section 7 was in-
tended to leave state statutes giving remedies for death completely
unaffected, even if the state statute be construed to extend to causes of
action accruing without the territorial limits of the state. Under this
view, it could be argued that, since the remedy in admiralty is
only an alternative one, exclusive jurisdiction has not been granted
to the federal courts under the act and the state courts should be
deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction. But the court in the instant
case follows the lead of many prior decisions in declaring that the
remedy in the federal courts is exclusive, so that concurrent juris-
diction of the state courts is denied, and the "saving" provisions of
section 7 are, in effect, read completely out of the act.
1954) for a detailed account of the act's legislative history.
23. Id. at 90.

